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Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio wrote a book entitled Descartes' Error (1994) in order to
address popular misconceptions about the mind, particularly those which relate to Cartesian
philosophy.  One of the author's major goals for the book is to argue that emotion contributes to reason,
that emotion is in fact necessary for rational thought to occur.  In order to link emotion to reason,
Damasio proposes a theory of mind which explains several mental functions in terms of neurological
representations.  Consciousness, reason, instinct and emotion all occur because the brain forms
representations of the subject's body and of the world in which the body acts.  Thought, in the broadest
sense of the term, is the process in which the brain manipulates these representations and causes them
to interact.
This thesis will examine Damasio's theory of mind in relation to two traditional topics in
cognitive science: consciousness and intelligence.  The first chapter simply explains the theory as
given in Descartes' Error.  Chapter two argues that, like everyone before him, Damasio fails to
explain how or why the brain generates consciousness.  Although the theory fails in this regard, it is
still useful as a description of the neurological processes which underlie consciousness, of the
mechanics of mind.  As such, this theory could serve as a conceptual complement to the traditional
paradigms of cognitive science, “GOFAI” and Embodied Cognition.  Chapter three will argue that
Damasio's theory is better suited to work with the latter paradigm than the former.
1
CHAPTER ONE: DAMASIO’S ERRORS AND DESCARTES’ ERROR
1.1 Introduction: Damasio’s Errors
After a long clinical and research career, neurologist Antonio Damasio wrote
Descartes’ Error (1994) to correct certain popular misconceptions about the mind.  As
the title suggests, the author’s aim was to undermine what he understood to be Cartesian
ideas, ones which have influenced both popular and scientific beliefs about the mind.
Specifically, Damasio first addresses mind-body dualism by discussing neurological
evidence that brain states affect mental states.  Secondly, he attempts to undermine what
he calls the “high reason” tradition of philosophy, in which emotion and reason are
treated as separate phenomena, with reason the superior faculty.  In this second venture,
Damasio winds up arguing that emotion is a necessary component of ostensibly rational
(logical) thought.  He starts with the case of Phineas Gage in order to support both of
these theses, but also draws on other historic and contemporary evidence.
Damasio acknowledges near the end of Descartes’ Error that dualism and the
high reason tradition trace back at least to Plato, and he further admits that he targeted
Descartes just because the Frenchman promulgated certain ideas so successfully in the
modern era.  It is not Damasio’s aim teach the history of philosophy, but to teach some
science.  In doing so, he proposes a computational-representational theory of mind with
the primary thesis that mind is the result of the interactions in the brain between
representations of the body and representations of objects external to it.  He contends that
these interactions give rise to logical thought, emotion, instinct, and even consciousness
itself.  Damasio’s very ambitious theory of mind is the topic of this treatise.
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Chapter one of is simply an exposition of the evidence, arguments and the theory
of mind presented in Descartes’ Error.  Chapter two will examine Damasio’s assertion
that consciousness results from the interaction of body-representations and object-
representations.  As clever as the theory of mind is in other respects, it simply fails as a
theory of consciousness, which is the central contention of chapter two.  Damasio returns
to his theory of consciousness in The Feeling of What Happens (1999), but does not add
any ideas which adequately explain consciousness, as shall also be discussed in the
chapter two.
Chapter three will examine Damasio’s theory from a computational perspective.
Two of the major paradigms in cognitive science are “GOFAI” (for “Good Old
Fashioned Artificial Intelligence”) and “Embodied Cognition.”  The former paradigm
asserts that the mind is the result of strictly logical operations acting on representations of
objects and representations of the world at large.  The latter paradigm, embodied
cognition, is an alternative approach developed by robotics experts frustrated with the
many failures of GOFAI.  Cogburn and Megill (2005) have suggested that Damasio’s
theory would be a useful conceptual complement to GOFAI.  They argue that adding
emotion to computation might solve the infamous “frame problem” of cognitive science.
However, chapter three of this thesis contends that Damasio’s theory of mind would be a
better complement to embodied cognition.  Damasio’s theory holds that the body is the
central topic of mental representation.  It seems more likely that somatic representation
(and computations based on such) would solve the problems faced by embodied
cognition than those faced by traditional GOFAI.
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Damasio misunderstood certain philosophical concepts in his work, thence
“Damasio's Errors.”  The first such error is that he only understands Cartesianism to
include mind-body dualism and the “high reason” tradition.  Because he does not
understand Descartes in greater detail and is not familiar with the history of philosophy,
he makes two more mistakes which are rather Cartesian in character.  As discussed in
chapter two, Damasio posits an idea rather like Descartes’ homuncular theory of
consciousness.  Through a mistake in rhetoric, Damasio unintentionally presupposes
consciousness on the part of unconscious brain representations, all in an attempt to
explain consciousness.  He unwittingly begs the question of the origin of consciousness.
Also, as discussed in chapter three, Damasio posits a theory of mind which is
computational (though it is based on somatic representations rather than logical
operations, thus is not “computational” in the strictest sense of the term).
Computationalism, the belief that human thought is composed of logical operations, is an
outgrowth of the very “high reason” tradition which Damasio tries to undermine.  It is
thus somewhat strange for Damasio to propose a (somatic-) computational theory of mind
as an alternative to “reason.”
On the one hand, these three errors spring from a lack of philosophical
sophistication on Damasio's part.  On the other, one of those errors turns out to be rather
inspired.  The somatic computationalism which he suggests, but does not elaborate upon
in detail, might lead to a new way of thinking about cognition.  Specifically, somatic
computation acting in tandem with embodied cognition might provide a new paradigm
for cognitive science.  Thus, while Damasio's work is based on some conceptual
oversights, his errors are fortunately very instructive ones.
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1.2 Descartes’ Error
Damasio presents Descartes’ Error as a refutation of the Cartesian philosophy of
mind.  However, Damasio does not explicitly identify which Cartesian concepts are his
targets until the last chapter of the book.  When Damasio does finally explain why he
attacks Descartes, he admits that he might as easily have challenged Plato.  He chose
Descartes as the representative of a “high reason” tradition which includes Plato, Kant,
and probably most philosophers in between.  The author only aims at Descartes because
the Frenchman promulgated dualism so successfully, because he is the source of much
modern belief about the mind.  Damasio uses “Cartesian” as an umbrella term which
refers to any sort of dualistic thought, whether it comes from Descartes or merely
resembles his work (Damasio 250).
Damasio attributes four general theses to Descartes.  (1) There is an immaterial
mind which exists separately from the body.  (2) This mind (and not the brain) is the
source of reason, including social and ethical cognition.  (3) Reason and emotion are
separate faculties of the mind; reason is superior and should thus dominate emotion.  (4)
In addition to mind-body dualism, there is something of a brain-body dualism as well.
The brain and body proper are almost autonomous of each other.  In this line of thought,
the body merely provides life support for the brain, which might as easily live in a vat by
itself.  Damasio takes aim at all four of these ideas, albeit he never untangles them
explicitly.  Damasio challenges not only Descartes on these four theses, but also the
wealth of scientific thought and common sense supported by dualism.
Damasio presents three interconnected theses in his challenge to Cartesianism.
(A) Emotion, feelings and regulatory biological processes all participate in reason.  (B)
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Feelings are not ineffable qualities of an immaterial mind, but rather the brain’s
perception of the state of the body.  The mind is the function of the brain in this thesis.
(C) The body is the chief subject of mental representations.  The “body proper,” which is
the body excluding the brain, is the frame of reference for mental operations.  Taken
together, these theses deconstruct the portion of Descartes’ philosophy of mind detailed
in (1) through (4) above.
Damasio never explicitly spells out his position on the relationship of mind to
brain, but his attitude conforms to identity theory.  He does not grant any quarter to the
idea that mental states could be anything besides brain states.  The elusive mental quality
of brain processes simply is not a topic of discussion in his work.  He never directly
attacks dualism by, say, raising the problem of mind-brain interaction.  However, it is
implicit to his work that mental states just are brain states.  He is so eager to prove that
changes to the brain cause changes to the mind that he neglects to explicitly state a
position on the mind-brain relationship.  If he is not exactly an identity theorist, the
differences between his attitude and identity theory are unnoticeably trivial.
His three theses lead to what he terms the “somatic marker hypothesis,” which is
a proposal for integrating emotion into an explanation of rationality.  In this thesis,
because emotions are indications of body state, emotions are able to “mark” various
stimuli according to how they affect the body.  Stimuli which affect the body in a
pleasant way are marked in so that they become priorities in mental calculations, and
negative stimuli are marked so that they can be avoided.
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1.3 Evidence against Descartes
Damasio opens the book with four chapters describing the neurological evidence
from which he will draw in later argumentation.  He actually works from a somewhat
small body of evidence, consisting of a handful of historic cases, anecdotal evidence of
larger groups of brain-damaged people, a dozen cases from his own research, and
evidence from animals.  Damasio chose to present this evidence in narrative form, telling
the stories of various brain-damaged people like scenes in a novel.  While his empirical
methods are not currently under discussion, it is worth mentioning that he bases the book
on a somewhat small body of information.  Nonetheless, his results seem reliable, and
there is no mention in literature of empirical problems with his work.
Damasio starts with a chapter about the legendary Phineas Gage, somewhat
surprisingly.  This almost mythic case is usually cited as early evidence that brain
damage changes a person’s mind.  It is somewhat surprising that Damasio is able to draw
on this specific case for his thesis.  Damasio finds in Gage’s story evidence for his own
central thesis, that emotions contribute to the processes of reasoning.  Gage’s job was to
use explosive powder to clear rocks out of the paths of new railroad tracks.  Someone
would first drill a hole in the ground, then Gage would partially fill the hole with
gunpowder, insert a fuse, then top the powder with sand.  The sand had to be packed into
place to make sure the blast went down into the rock, and not back up into the air.  Gage
was purportedly a master of this delicate task, praised and valued by his employers for his
mastery of the work (Damasio 4).  He even had an iron tamping-rod custom-made to his
specifications.  One day in 1848, Gage was working, became distracted, and tamped the
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explosive directly.  This, of course, made the powder explode, which projected the
tamping-rod up into Gage’s skull.
Amazingly, Gage survived the wound and even the severe infection that followed.
The account of Gage after the accident is somewhat sketchy because no one understood
the neuro-psychology of the case at the time, because there simply was no way to
document the wound internally, because Gage left the U.S. for a few years, and because
the Civil War coincided with the last few years of his life.  But the available evidence
shows that while most of Gage’s intellectual capacity and motor skills were unharmed,
his personality changed drastically.  More specifically, his social behavior and decision-
making ability changed after the accident.  He lost sight in the left eye, but not the right.
He could still walk normally and use his hands dexterously, and he had no noticeable
difficulties with speaking or the general use of language (Damasio 8).  Somehow, the
hole in his head did not destroy most of his “rational” capacities, nor his motor skills.
While Gage was spared obvious damage, something more subtle did occur.  He
became a much less pleasant person.  Where he had purportedly been a man of
“temperate habits” and much energy before the accident, he became something else
afterward (ibid.).  He began using extraordinary profanity in public settings, with no
apparent regard for the comfort of others.  He also became capricious in his character,
formulating great plans and quickly abandoning them.  He also became peculiarly
boastful of his wound, eagerly displaying it and the tamping-iron which he kept with him
for the rest of his life (a possible case of “collecting” behavior in contemporary terms).
One doctor commented that the balance between his intellectual faculty and animal
propensities” had been destroyed (ibid).  His friends and acquaintances noticed this,
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famously commenting that “Gage was no longer Gage.”  He also could not hold down
work after the accident.  Though he had been a self-sufficient employee before the
accident, the railroad company dismissed him, and afterwards he drifted from job to job.
He eventually died in the care of a relative.  What Damasio reveals in his telling of the
story is not just that Gage’s personality changed because of the wound, but that certain
functions of his mind changed as well.  While he could still walk, talk and do physical
labor like an ordinary man, some subtle functions of his mind were damaged.
Specifically, his social behavior changed, as did his emotional restraint and his capacity
to think in the long-term.  These cognitive deficits are part of what Damasio later terms
the “Gage matrix,” and are the signature of brain damage such as Gage’s.
Luckily enough, Gage’s skull was preserved in a medical museum.  In the second
chapter of his book, Damasio presents speculation about the precise nature of the damage
the iron rod inflicted.  Some of his colleagues did very clever investigation using
computer imagery (Damasio 23, 31).  Their studies concluded that Gage likely did not
suffer damage to the language and motor-control areas of the brain, which is consistent
with the story in the first chapter.  They also concluded that Gage’s damage was local to
the orbital (or ventromedial) prefrontal region.  Ventromedial means “middle of the
belly,” prefrontal means “before the frontal.”  Thus, the damage was to the underside of
the frontal lobes, somewhat behind the very front of the brain.  This is the part of the
brain roughly above and behind the eye sockets.  Having connected the behavior of Gage
to a specific type of wound, Damasio goes on to discuss a patient with damage to the
same part of the brain and similar changes in behavior.
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Chapter three focuses on the case of one of the author’s own patients named
“Elliot,” presented by Damasio as “A Modern Phineas Gage” (the title of the chapter).
With firsthand knowledge of Elliot’s case, the author is able to expand his account of the
role of the orbital prefrontal region in rationality, social cognition, and planning.  The
author does not disclose Elliot’s specific job occupation, but explains that the patient had
been employed in a “business firm” (Damasio 35).  In that capacity, he had to perform
commonplace clerical tasks such as organizing documents.  In his thirties, Elliot
developed a type of brain tumor that, while itself benign, was also very dangerous
because it compressed the frontal lobes.  When Elliot’s tumor was removed, the damaged
frontal-lobe tissue was extracted with it.  Thus, the patient suffered damage possibly
similar to what Gage experienced.
Before the tumor, Elliot had been a responsible employee, a family man, and a
generally well-adjusted member of society.  But his personality changed after the tumor’s
removal.  He had to be prompted to go to work in the morning, he could no longer
prioritize tasks, thus he seemed to suffer something like the “frame problem” so famous
in cognitive science.  He would focus on trivial tasks, or on trivial aspects of tasks, to the
exclusion of his larger goals.  He would also lose focus and, for example, decide to spend
an entire day reading one of the documents he was supposed to be sorting.  He also could
not easily shift from one task to another.  In addition to his work problems, Elliot became
involved in a questionable financial scheme that led to bankruptcy, this despite warnings
from friends.  Even forewarned, he would not act rationally to avoid a disastrous
investment.  He also began exhibiting collecting behavior.  Damasio belabors the Gage
comparison quite enough in the book, but it does seem significant that Elliot could no
10
longer work and exhibited collecting.  There are, of course, differences between this case
and Gage’s.  Elliot did not use profanity and was not as generally “intense” as the railway
worker (Damasio 36-38).  The neuroscientist admits that he has no explanation for the
differences between their cases.  Minor variations in the location of the wound or
variations in their backgrounds or general personality might account for the differences in
their outcomes.  While the differences are a bit worrisome, the similarities are
conspicuous and support the author’s contentions.
What is significant in this case is that Elliot retained a great deal of his cognitive
capacity.  He seemed competent enough to return to work, in fact he was initially denied
disability benefits.  He could speak and move about normally, and his intelligence
seemed generally intact.  What had changed was just his personality, in common
parlance.  Damasio put him through an exhaustive battery of intelligence and personality
tests, and Elliot did quite well on them.  According to the Weschler test, he had superior
intelligence.  He also did well on tests for attention, working memory, short-term
memory, memories of past events, arithmetic, language, new learning, and perception.  In
short, what would normally be considered his “reason” was intact.  He also tested
normally on personality tests, such as the MMPI.  All of this seemed incompatible with
the fact that he could not function in the real world (Damasio 41).
Quite significantly, the author also put Elliot through a number of tests of
reasoning and ethical judgement, and he did well.  On these tests he was able to reason
about ethical and financial matters correctly.  On one test, he was able to generate options
as possible responses to ethical and financial situations (Damasio 46).  On another test,
Elliot showed he could anticipate consequences generally.  On yet another type of test, he
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was able to invent effective ways of accomplishing social tasks.  On a fourth type of test,
Elliot showed he was aware of specifically social, interpersonal consequences.  And on a
fifth type of test, he was able to make moral judgements.  This is all significant because
the patient was able to perform in theory what he could not do in the real world.  His
store of background knowledge and theoretical reasoning capacities were intact, they just
did not work in real-world situations.
Damasio winds down the story of this patient with some speculation about his
case, hinting at the eventual explanation.  Elliot had access to his background knowledge,
was able to reason about complex matters, and did not suffer basic defects of intellect.
Whatever the damage was, it seemed to “set in at the late stages of reasoning, close to or
at the point at which choice making or response selection must occur.”  The answer
would ultimately lie in another consequence of the tumor.  In their interviews, the author
noted that Elliot’s emotions were very flat, that he suffered “shallow affect.”  He could
describe important things without emoting, he seemed extraordinarily contained.
Damasio does not go on about this in great detail, but speculates at the end of chapter
three that somehow this emotional flatness eliminated Elliot’s reasoning capacity.  Thus,
this contemporary case affirms what the Gage story suggests, that the orbital prefrontal
region is involved in emotion and reasoning, and that emotions participate in reasoning in
some way (Damasio 50-51).
After describing Elliot’s case, Damasio goes on in chapter four to briefly survey
other cases of prefrontal damage.  He sketches four historical cases similar to those of
Gage and Elliot.  The first is a stockbroker, first studied in 1932, who had a brain tumor
similar to Elliot’s.  His personal life and career also unraveled, and his modesty and
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effectiveness in life were replaced by braggadocio and an inability to enact any of the
elaborate plans he devised.  He also suffered from shallow emotional affect, unable to
feel anything even when considering his own tragic story.
A second case from the 1940s was studied by Wilder Penfield and colleagues, and
focused on a sixteen year old child who suffered severe damage to his frontal lobes.  The
child’s personality failed to develop normally afterward, and his social behavior
deteriorated.  The third case, also beginning in the 1940s, was an infant who suffered
frontal lobe damage near birth.  The child was not stupid, but his behavior was always
abnormal and maladaptive.  He was never able to hold down a job or otherwise function
normally in society, including romantically.  In both of these cases, patients were not
flexible in their thinking; they were rigid and unimaginative in their daily activities.
They were unable to plan, organize their effort, or work gainfully.  They also boasted
about themselves, could not interact socially and were not very interested in life, as
though they also suffered shallow affect.
The fourth case Damasio mentions is not a specific person, but comes from the
studies of patients who underwent the prefrontal leucotomy procedure starting in the
1930s.  This procedure was the precursor to the infamous frontal lobotomies that were so
massively abused in the next two decades.  In the leucotomy, certain parts of the
prefrontal brain areas are deliberately damaged in order to alleviate the severe anxiety
that certain mental disorders cause.  While the patients did experience less anxiety, and
their intellectual faculties were intact afterwards, the procedure led to shallow affect in
these people.  They also manifested less creativity and decisiveness afterward.  Like
Elliot, they were unable to feel very much of anything afterwards (Damasio 54-61).
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Damasio also includes in chapter four a brief discussion on evidence from
animals, specifically monkeys.  Despite million of years of evolutionary distance between
humans and the other primate species, damage to the prefrontal areas of monkeys has a
very similar affect to what happens in people.  The wounded monkeys display less
emotion on their faces, and presumably experience less emotion.  Prefrontal damage also
disrupts their social behavior, particularly grooming.  They also could no longer reason
their way through standard lab tests, which is possibly analogous to the breakdown of
planning and reasoning in human patients.
Damasio also introduces a second type of brain damage and associated mental
disorder in chapter four.  The new topic he presents turns out to be an important
secondary source of information.  A disorder called anosognosia results from damage to
the right (and not left) sensorimotor areas of the brain.  Patients with this damage are
partially paralyzed on the left sides of their bodies, unable to move their left arms, for
example.  Interestingly, these people do not know that they are paralyzed.  They act and
talk as though they were not injured.  When confronted, they seem surprised that they
cannot move their limbs.  Some insist that they might have once been paralyzed, but no
longer are.  One patient had to look around to find her own limp arm, because she had so
little sensation from it.  That is the main problem of anosognosia: the victims cannot
sense their physical defects automatically or quickly, and this never disappears in severe
cases.
The way Damasio explains it, the human brains contain internal representations or
maps of their bodies.  In anosognosia, these maps are no longer receiving updated
information from the body.  Therefore, these patients are not aware of their own bodies.
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While these cases are markedly different from prefrontal cases, there are also some
similarities.  Anosognosics are notoriously unworried about their condition, they do not
seem too perturbed by their conditions.  They suffer shallow affect like prefrontal
patients.  Anosognosics are also unable to theorize about the future or implement plans
effectively, also like prefrontal patients (Damasio 62-70).
This discussion of anosognosia might feel somewhat random, especially because
it is in the middle of chapter four’s survey of the history of prefrontal patients.  However,
it does still deal with the same concepts.  Because emotion is the perception of body
states, any interruption to the perception of body states will affect emotion.  The
disruption of emotion seems to be the primary cognitive defect of the pre-frontal cases.
Thus, anosognosia is important as a secondary source of information to support the theses
Damasio posits based on the prefrontal cases.
All of this evidence sets the stage for a refutation of Descartes, at least as far as
Damasio understands him.  The immaterial mind is quite obviously dependent upon and
determined by the material brain (contrary to thesis 1 above).  Reason, traditionally seen
as the purview of the mind, is a process that occurs in the brain.  Reason is disrupted
when the brain is damaged (contrary to thesis 2 above).  Reason apparently depends on
emotion for its success.  Patients who could no longer experience emotion properly could
also not reason properly (contrary to 3 above).  Damasio does not yet explicitly attack
Descartes in these first four chapters, but he sets the stage for the overturn of
Cartesianism.  Having thus presented his evidence, the author proceeds in the next
chapters to explain what happens in the minds of prefrontal patients and anosognosics.  In
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doing so, Damasio hopes to offer a theory to replace the commonsense notions of mind
that more-or-less trace back to Descartes.
1.4 Damasio’s Argument
In chapter five, Damasio begins with “Assembling an Explanation” for the strange
behavior of the patients he discusses in previous chapters.  He offers a computational
theory of mind.  Faced with a social or personal problem, the mind must use both “broad-
based knowledge and reasoning strategies to operate over such knowledge” (Damasio
83).  The author also observes that emotions arise from the same sorts of brain processes
that serve to regulate body functions.  He also notes that the brain and body interact in a
very complex manner (contrary to thesis 4 above), using both nerves and bloodstream
chemicals to pass information to each other.  The brain and body are a single, unified
organism, not separate entities as dualism suggests.  There is a coherent theory of mind in
all of these facts, and it a computational-representational theory.
The first feature of his theory of mind is the three-part nervous system consisting
of sensory nerves, brain proper, and motor nerves.  In his formulation, brains are
basically the bundle of nerves between sensation and action.  Some nerves are attached to
sensory apparatuses and carry information to the brain.  Others nerves are attached to
muscles and take their cues from the brain, causing motion of one sort or another.  Brains
are the nervous tissue, the neurons, between sensory and motor neurons.  As evolution
produced more and more complex brains, more neurons were “interpolated” or inserted
between sense and motor neurons (Damasio 89).  It is in these intermediate neurons that
the operations of mind take place.  But, observes Damasio, inserting a few neurons
between sense organs and muscles does not automatically produce a mind.  This is to say
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that the mere presence of a brain is not sufficient to produce a mind.  A mind is “the
ability to display images internally and to order those images in a process called thought”
(ibid.).  This is the heart of his theory: the mind consists of images generated and
manipulated by the brain.  Thus, his theory might be called “image computationalism.”
The brain is the nervous tissue between sensation and action, and it is the imagery in the
brain that generates mind.  What happens is that the brain receives sensory input, then
performs some sort of operations on sensory images and memories (which are stored
images).  The brain then selects a possible motor response from a “menu” of existing
responses, or it can generate a new motor response.  Damasio is quick to point out that
that images exist in every sensory modality.  There are thus visual, tactile, olfactory, and
auditory images in the mind (Damasio 93).
Having introduced this theory of mind, Damasio makes his first explicit critique
of Descartes.  He explains that there is no single area in the brain in which all of the
images from the different sensory modalities combine into a composite.  There are areas
where multi-modal images form, but these are nothing like first-person phenomenology.
This is all to say that the evidence of neuroscience shows there is no “Cartesian theater”
in the brain, thus the homuncular version of mind is a “false intuition” (Damasio 94-96,
100).  The appearance of mental unity is more a matter of simultaneous occurrence of
different brain functions.  The unified mind is thus perhaps an illusion generated by the
timing of multiple brain functions.  Although each sensory modality has its own attention
and working memory, global attention and memory appears concentrated in the prefrontal
areas.  This is to say that the manipulation of images that constitutes consciousness
occurs in the prefrontal areas damaged in Gage and the other cases (ibid.).
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After introducing his basic theory of mind and explaining its multi-modal nature,
Damasio next explains the representational nature of brain imagery.  Some images are the
result of recalled memories or imaginings of the future, but the most important source of
imagery are the early sensory cortices.  Damasio explains the image-generating
mechanism for sensation because recalled and imagined images are based on it.
Memories and imaginings are known to activate the same “circuitry” as does sensation.
The early sensory cortices are just the first parts of the brain to receive input from the
sense organs.
As Damasio uses the terms, images are based on representations.  The early
sensory cortices form representations of sensation, and the rest of the brain operates on
these representations to form images.  Amazingly, the representations that form in the
early sensory cortices are “topographically organized.”  This is to say that the
representations in these cortices visually resemble the objects they represent (Damasio
98, 104).  The initial representations of sensed objects somehow look like the objects.
Damasio only cites evidence that visual-cortical representations are topographically
represented, but he seems to think that this aspect of mental imagery applies to the other
modalities as well.  He does not go into any detail about how, say, sound-representations
resemble the original sounds, but he clearly thinks that representations in all sense
modalities are topographically analogous to their originals (Damasio 99).
The topographically-similar representations are a necessary condition for
consciousness, but not a sufficient one.  In order to give rise to consciousness, these
representations have to be associated with something else.  Specifically, these sensory
representations must join up with the brain’s representations of the body proper (the body
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outside of the brain).  When sensory representations occur simultaneously with
representations of the body, subjective experience occurs (ibid.).  While sensory
representations are the foundation on which mind rests, memories and imagined things
also have to join with body representations in order to enter consciousness.  When
Damasio introduces this concept, that consciousness is the correlation of representations,
he makes sure to point out that the self is a neurological state, not a homunculus.  He
again takes the effort to attack what he understands about Cartesianism.
As Damasio uses the terms, images are the stuff of consciousness.  Images are the
subjective experience of representations in the brain; conscious images form when sense
representations are connected to body representations at the instant of stimulus.  Thus
consciousness is the state of perceiving images.  Having sketched his theory of mind,
Damasio next explains that the representations in the mind are not stored as facsimiles of
the originals, even though the sensory representations were topographically similar to
their originals.  Memories are not stored as facsimiles of the original objects, but as what
he calls “dispositional representations.” These are sets of instructions which tell the
sensory cortices how to activate in order to recreate the image of something previously
experienced (Damasio 101-102).  Memory is reconstructive, not photostatic, and the
brain contains sets of instructions for reactivating the sensory cortices in order to recreate
the experience of the remembered sensation.  Damasio’s choice of term, “dispositional
representation,” is not entirely clear, but it seems to be based on the fact that these
representations predispose the brain to act in certain ways, to fire in certain patterns.
In this theory, all knowledge is contained as dispositional representations.  These
are instructions which tell the neurons how to fire in order to recreate the sensation
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originally experienced.  Acquired knowledge is stored in evolutionarily recent structures,
such as the cerebral cortex and various sub-cortical nuclei.  Innate knowledge, that with
which people are born, is stored in evolutionarily more ancient structures such as the
hypothalamus, brain stem and limbic system (Damasio 104-105, 127-128).  Acquired
knowledge is used for reasoning, planning and creativity; innate knowledge is used for
body regulation and often does not enter the conscious mind.
Images in every sensory modality are the primary content of thought (Damasio
106-108), images are based on representations that are topographically similar to sensed
objects, and these images are stored as non-topographic dispositional representations.
That is Damasio’s theory of mind, which he spends the rest of the text explaining, and
which he will presently use to explain the strange behavior of the Gage patients described
in the first four chapters.  In order to apply this theory, Damasio goes on in chapter six to
explain how his theory accommodates biological regulation.
Certain biological processes are just a part of everyday life and these are encoded
into the brain in more-or-less static patterns, which are fixed by the genes.  Both
emotions and feelings are manifestations of “drives and instincts,” and these are directly
based on biological need.  Drives and instincts either cause a being to act in a certain
way, or else create a physiological condition that inclines the organism to act in a certain
way (Damasio 115).  Instincts thus are the conscious experience of a biological need.
The neuroscientist does not go into a great deal of detail about this point, but one can
extrapolate a lot from the minimal treatment he gives it.
Some activities of biological regulation operate beneath the level of consciousness
because they do not require action to intervene.  Some of this regulation is controlled
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within the brain, but does not enter consciousness at all, such as hormone levels in the
bloodstream.  But some biological regulation does require conscious intervention, as in
the case of hunger.  A drop in blood sugar activates a dispositional representation in the
brain that causes the sensation of hunger, which is a feeling or a perception of the body’s
condition.  The person then acts to correct this condition by eating.  And so it is with
some other instinctive behaviors—they are programmed into the brain and operate either
beneath consciousness or else they encourage the subject to voluntarily act to alter some
circumstance (Damasio 116).  Perception of bodily state also allows the organism to
begin classifying experiences as “good” or “bad,” based on how they affect the body.
Any circumstance that causes the body to thrive would be good, and anything that causes
harm to the body would be felt as bad.  This observation, that good and bad derive from
the condition of the body, will play an important role in the final explanation Damasio
proposes.  He thus proposes that moral judgments arise directly from the condition of the
body, but also that social systems evolve to guide and sculpt instinctive behavior.  He
proposes that social learning simply supplements the innate capacities to increase an
organism’s chance of surviving.  Social goals, he believes, trace back to basic biological
goals.
Damasio has thus outlined a theory of mind based on representations.  Thought is
composed of operations on those representations; bio-regulatory drives (instincts) enter
the mind through other representations.  Damasio has thus incorporated both thought and
instinct into his theory of mind.  With all of this said, Damasio goes on in chapter seven
to incorporate emotions into his theory.  He quotes William James to introduce the basic
idea that feelings are intimately connected with the state of the body: “What kind of an
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emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of quickened heart-beats nor of
shallow breathing…were present…it is quite impossible for me to think” (qtd. 129).
Damasio proposes that “specific pattern[s] of body reaction” are programmed into the
brain as innate dispositional representations (Damasio 130-164).  For example, the brain
has an innate disposition to cause the body to tremble in dangerous circumstances.  The
brain contains both a representation of the danger, but also a representation of the body’s
response to it.  And it is the perception or feeling of the body’s condition that constitutes
the emotion fear.  Emotions are something which can be felt; they are the experience of
the body’s pre-programmed responses to certain stimuli.  Feelings are perceptions of
body states, and emotions affect body states.  But not all feelings are emotional (Damasio
143-145).
Some other emotions are just pre-programmed bodily responses to stimulus.  The
perception of these pre-programmed responses are emotions and require little to no
cognitive evaluation.  Apparently, over the course of animal evolution, certain patterns of
response were so common that they became incorporated into the genes of the smarter
animals.  The extent to which emotions are programmed into the genes might be
considerable, as Damasio suggests certain physical features innately inspire fear
(sharpness, largeness and such) (131).
Damasio smartly anticipates a shortcoming to this aspect of his theory.  Some
emotions seem to have a larger cognitive component and require more conscious
contemplation than others.  Thus, Damasio makes the distinction between primary and
secondary emotions as soon as he introduces this definition of emotion.  The primary
emotions are happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust (Damasio 149).  These are the
22
pre-programmed emotions (genetically determined) and depend on evolutionarily older
circuits, including the amygdala, limbic system, and the anterior cingulate.
The secondary emotions are subtle variations on the primary ones.  Secondary
emotions occur when a stimulus or a thought activates certain dispositional
representations, which in turn cause the body to respond in certain patterns (as with the
primary emotions).  The difference is that the secondary emotions depend on more recent
circuitry than the primaries, particularly the frontal cortices and the adjacent prefrontal
areas.  These emotions are more sensitive to learning and experience than the primaries.
Secondary emotions result when sensory input enters the prefrontal area and activates a
separate set of dispositional representations than those which correspond to the primary
emotions (Damasio 137-139).  The secondary emotions can be activated by more subtle
cognitive content (processed by the frontal lobes) and they involve more subtle
physiological responses than the primaries.  The perception of these body states are the
secondary emotions proper.  Euphoria and ecstasy are variations on happiness;
melancholy and wistfuness are variations of sadness; panic and shyness of fear.  Other
feelings such as Schadenfreude and embarrassment are also variations on primary
emotions (Damasio 149-151).
In addition to the feelings associated with the emotions, there are also important
“background feelings,” which are the moment-to-moment representations of the body in
the brain.  Anosognosics have defective mechanisms for generating these feelings (ibid.).
These feelings enter into consciousness and take part in reasoning just as the emotions
do.  Anosognosics cannot reason correctly about their physical conditions because they
are not receiving correct information about their bodies (Damasio 154).
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In just the same way that background feelings enter the mind and participate in
reason, so too do the feelings of emotion enter the mind to participate in reason.
Emotions are feelings about the body (Damasio 159) and can affect decisions about the
body—most decisions ultimately trace back to the body.  In the theory that Damasio is
proposing, emotions are “just as cognitive as any other perceptual image, and just as
dependent on cerebral-cortex processing as any other image” (ibid.).  Although Damasio
is somewhat vague about the term “cognitive,” he seems to mean that emotions are
appropriate responses to stimuli, that are a form of data-processing, they are a form of
decision-making themselves.  They also contribute to reasoning proper (Damasio 159,
164-165).  Emotions are not just random sensations which have nothing to do with
rationality.
With emotion now in his theory, Damasio introduces in chapter eight the
centerpiece of his new theory of mind, the somatic-marker hypothesis.  His goal in this
book is to show that reasoning consists not merely of using logical strategies to decide
among available options, but that emotion somehow factors into the process (Damasio
166, 171).  The SM hypothesis is that emotional responses, both primary and secondary,
are perceptions of how various stimuli make the body react.  That which generates an
unpleasant response is bad, that which generates a pleasant response is good.  What
Damasio terms the “high reason” view belongs to Plato, Descartes and Kant, and holds
that “formal logic will, by itself, get us to the best available solution for any problem”
and “Rational processing must be unencumbered by passion” (Damasio 171).  But logic
alone does not seem to work for the Gage patients.  Elliot could reason quite well, but not
perform tasks which ostensibly depend solely on reason.  So, Damasio proposes that
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emotions are (cognitive) evaluations that rest on the state of the body, and these
supplement logic.  Somatic markers are feelings stored as dispositional representations
which mark a situation as good or bad in reference to the body (thus “somatic marker”)
(Damasio 173-175).  He described these markers as a sort of “biasing device” that enter
into the decision-making process, filtering some information and options.  They
presumably highlight the salient features of a situation (Damasio never quite says this,
but he does talk about framing, which relates to salience).  Somatic markers help one to
choose the best option, highlighting those options which are best and worst relative to the
body.  The best option, naturally, would be that which most likely leads to survival,
pleasure, and happiness.  The somatic markers sift options and allow the logical devices
operant in the mind to pick the best options (Damasio 173-175, 179, 189).  Thus, feelings
participate in the more rational functions of consciousness.  They speed up the decision-
making process, allowing the brain to immediately rule out some options, and
predisposing it toward others.  They also increase the accuracy of the process, by pre-
selecting the options most likely to lead to survival.
1.5 Conclusion
Damasio ends his book with four short chapters.  Chapter nine discusses
additional tests he ran to confirm the somatic marker hypothesis.  Chapter ten discusses
his version of an embodied mind hypothesis.  Chapters eleven and twelve discuss broader
philosophical implications of the book.  As interesting as this material is, it does not add
substantially to the content of the theory.
As to the Gage patients, when their prefrontal areas are damaged, their secondary
emotions and somatic markers no longer function or do not function as well, depending
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on the extent of the damage.  The prefrontal area is apparently where some of the
processing of secondary emotions occurs and where somatic markers do their work
(Damasio 211).  Gage patients can still feel primary emotions, whereas patients with
damage to the amygdala and limbic system can feel neither primary nor secondary
emotions.  But prefrontal patients can no longer reason correctly over problems because
their somatic markers are not reaching the primary emotional circuitry.  Their emotions
cannot affect their reasoning, thus their reasoning fails to operate.
Damasio has thus refuted all four of the Cartesian concepts he aims at. (1) The
mind is clearly generated by the brain.  (2) Social processing, ethical reasoning, and the
“higher” features of mind are not the products of an immaterial mind, but are carried out
in the prefrontal areas, and draw on other brain structures. (3) Reason depends on
emotion, without it people cannot reason.  (4) The body and brain are an integrated unit
and should not be thought of separately.  The brain evolved to tend to the body.
As stated before, the problem is not that Damasio is necessarily wrong in his
central contentions.  The problem is that his understanding of Descartes is incomplete.
He does not quite seem to grasp that computationalism is an outgrowth of the very “high
reason” tradition he opposes.  If he had understood this, he might not have proposed a
computational-representational theory of mind.  While his treatment of Descartes is
somewhat amateur, this is no severe indictment of Damasio’s work.  His primary thesis is
correct: emotion does participate in reason.  Nonetheless, Damasio makes an error here,
but it is a fortuitously instructive one.  Like Descartes before him, if someone had not
made this mistake, then later thinkers would not be able to untangle it.
26
CHAPTER TWO: THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
2.1 Introduction
Damasio’s theory of mind raises any number of difficulties.  Probably the most
serious shortcoming of the theory is its explanation of consciousness.  For current
discussion, consciousness refers to subjective experience or first-person phenomenology.
Damasio himself must have noticed that consciousness was the weak part of his theory,
for he dedicated his next book, The Feeling of What Happens (1999), to shoring up just
this part of the theory.  According to the neuroscientist, consciousness results from the
juxtaposition (temporal superimposition) of otherwise insensate representations.  The
brain represents the subject’s body and the world beyond the body.  At the same time that
a representation of an object enters the brain, the brain also represents the body in the
process of representing an object.  The brain notices an external object, but also notices
that it is observing a representation of that object.  On the one hand, this is a very astute
observation—conscious experience is not merely observing a thing, but knowing that
observation is taking place.  On the other hand, this is an unsatisfying explanation of
subjectivity, it feels somehow incomplete.
It turns out that Damasio, despite his own claims to the contrary, makes a mistake
very like what Descartes did in his homuncular theory of mind.  In his language and
explanation of consciousness, Damasio presupposes subjectivity on the part of
unconscious entities.  His explanation attributes to the brain a quality of mind, the ability
to observe subjectively, when it should be explaining how that quality occurs in the first
place.  Even on close inspection of the theory, it turns out that Damasio is unaware of
having done anything wrong.  He begs the question of consciousness without realizing it.
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Damasio’s “homuncular” mistake scuttles his explanation of subjectivity, but his
theory does still describe the operations of the brain which produce subjective
experiences, including emotion and instinct.  There are parts of the brain which seem to
be maps or representations of the body, and the brain does process sensory data in a
process which can rightly be called representation.  And the phenomenology of emotion
does agree with the superimposition process which Damasio describes.  Thus, while the
theory cannot explain why consciousness arises, it can still function as a description of
the mechanical part of consciousness.  Given the intractability of consciousness as a
philosophical and scientific problem, this mechanical description may be the best anyone
can realistically expect from a theory of mind.
2.2 The “Homuncular” Mistake
Although Damasio wants very much to escape Cartesian philosophy, he just does
not manage it.  He understands Cartesianism to include mind-body dualism and the
homuncular-theatrical theory of mind, but does not understand the homuncular mistake in
depth.  Thus, he makes something similar to that same mistake.  In Consciousness
Explained (1991), Daniel Dennett explains how Descartes made the original homuncular
mistake, and why later theorists have sometimes repeated it:
Even the most sophisticated materialists today often forget that once
Descartes’ ghostly res cogitans is discarded, there is no longer a role for a
centralized gateway, or indeed for any functional center to the brain.  (106)
Damasio cites Dennett’s objection to this Cartesian theater, but he only
understands part of that objection.  Damasio knows that there is no central viewing place
in the brain where all the information in the brain comes together and is observed by an
observer (Damasio 94).  However, Dennett makes a larger point in his objection to
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theatrical consciousness.  The homuncular mistake occurs because of the presupposition
of subjectivity on the part of the contents of the mind:
The brain is Headquarters, the place where the ultimate observer is, but
there is no reason to believe that the brain itself has any deeper headquarters, any
inner sanctum….  In short, there is no observer inside the brain. (ibid.)
Dennett’s objection is rather difficult to grasp, fortunately he spends an entire chapter on
it.  What he means is that there is no single point in the brain at which pre-experiential
data become conscious information, no “mental divide” (Dennett 109).  There is a
“spatiotemporal smearing” of observation across much of the brain (Dennett 126).
Observation does not occur at a specific place or time, it is not a localizable process.
Subjectivity is essentially just the way people characterize the sum of mental processes;
the appearance of observation is essentially an illusion.  Damasio comes very close to this
concept of mind by supposing that the theatrical nature of phenomenology, the sense of
being an observer in a theater, is merely the result of the simultaneous function of
different brain areas.  Damasio comes very close to Dennett’s idea, but just misses it.
For Dennett, attempting to locate subjectivity in some specific function of the
brain is essentially the same as locating it in some specific area of the brain.  In both
cases, the theorist has to presuppose one part/process of the brain to be capable of
magically generating subjectivity, of already possessing it.  Damasio invokes the
subjectivity which an observer would bring to the mind; he still talks about the mind as
though there were already a subjective presence in there.  The observer might not be
located anywhere in the brain, but observation still takes place.  To presuppose
observation is to presuppose an observer.  Damasio does precisely this.  The
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neuroscientist offers his own summary of his theory of consciousness, which warrants
quoting at length:
We become conscious […] when our organisms internally construct and
internally exhibit a specific kind of wordless knowledge—that our organism has
been changed by an object—and when such knowledge occurs along with the
salient internal exhibit of an object.  The simplest form in which this knowledge
emerges is the feeling of knowing….
Core consciousness occurs when the brain’s representation devices
generate an imaged, nonverbal account of how the organism’s own state is
affected by the organism’s processing of an object….
The organism, as a unit, is mapped in the organism’s brain, within
structures that regulate the organism’s life and signal its internal state
continuously; the object is also mapped within the brain, in the sensory and motor
structures activated by the interaction of the organism with the object; both
organism and object are mapped as neural patterns. (Damasio 168-169)
This passage is from The Feeling of What Happens, in which the neuroscientist focuses
exclusively on his theory of consciousness, but this description does not disagree in any
major details with the concepts presented in Descartes’ Error.  There, he makes the
statement:
Brains can have many intervening steps in the circuits mediating between
stimulus and response, and still have no mind, if they do not meet an essential
condition: the ability to display images internally and to order those images in a
process called thought.  (Damasio 89)
He later explains that “images are probably the main content of our thoughts, regardless
of the sensory modality in which they are generated” (Damasio 107).  He argues here that
words and abstract symbols (such as mathematical or logical formulae) are not the
primary content of thought, but that images are (Damasio 106-107).
The subjectivity mistake is present in these passages.  Damasio inadvertently
constructs a homuncular explanation of mind by talking about subjectivity as though it
were a localizable process.  The mistake here is to presuppose mind (subjectivity) on the
part of mindless objects, and then claim that those mindless objects produce mind.
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Essentially, this explanation just begs the question of consciousness.  But because
Damasio uses subjective rhetoric to explain mind, the resulting explanation sounds like a
theory of consciousness, though it is not.
The quotes from Descartes’ Error show this mistake directly.  Thoughts are
supposed to be made up of images, and mind results only when the brain forms images.
Thus mind is essentially a series of images.  But if there are images and the mind is
conscious, then presumably there must also be an observer.  This presupposed observer
must be the source of consciousness, because there is nothing else in the theory to
provide it.  Either the images are themselves conscious, or else the juxtaposition of
different images produces consciousness.  Damasio favors the latter explanation, but does
not explain how it happens, which is why he revisited the subject in the later book.
The explanation given in The Feeling of What Happens is supposed to clear up
this issue, but does not.  There Damasio posits that the brain forms representations of
observed objects, but at the same time it forms detailed representations of the body in the
act of observing.  The coincidence of object images and self-observing-object images
should produce consciousness.  He says that a human organism becomes conscious when
it “exhibits a specific kind of wordless knowledge.”  But the word “exhibit” sounds
suspiciously like a conscious, deliberate act of display, and it also requires that some
conscious entity be present to observe the exhibition.  Thus, he seems to suggest that
there is a conscious entity exhibiting knowledge and a conscious entity observing it.  He
also uses the word “knowledge,” which contains an element of subjectivity as well.
Unthinking, unconscious entities such as books and computers are able to represent
knowledge, but do not themselves possess it.  Knowledge is generally the word reserved
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for the contents of a living mind, it is the word which names the subjective experience of
containing a representation.
Further, the exhibition of knowledge enters consciousness as the “feeling of
knowing.”  The term “feeling” does not refer to the kind of detection of which a
mechanical device is capable, but to the experience a sentient being has when he
encounters something.  The sentient experience of feeling includes the ineluctable quality
of the experience—the redness of red, the painfulness of pain, etc.  Here, again, Damasio
explains consciousness by attributing subjectivity to a brain which his theory says is
unconscious before the process of representation.
This subjective rhetoric is interspersed among more appropriate mechanical
language which does not presuppose subjectivity.  The neuroscientist refers to
“representations” and “neural patterns,” neither of which is necessarily conscious.
Representations are currently the dominant method of explaining cognition mechanically,
and the neural patterns which interact to create consciousness are not themselves
conscious.  Damasio uses subjective and mechanical rhetoric together without explaining
the connection between the two.  Representations become knowledge and feelings, and
neural patterns become sentient, subjective entities: “core consciousness occurs when the
brain’s representation devices generate an imaged, nonverbal account.”  Damasio’s
mistake is an unintentional, maybe even accidental, equating of subjective and
mechanical rhetoric.  He does not explain how the juxtaposition of two or more insensate
representations, or the interaction of unconscious sets of neurons, can create a subjective
experience.  He just introduces the subjective rhetoric and acts as though this explains
consciousness.
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Attributing consciousness to unconscious entities, then explaining consciousness
in terms of those entities begs the question of consciousness.  Begging the question is a
serious enough error, but even if Damasio somehow retooled the rhetoric in his theory, he
would still not have an explanation of consciousness.  If the implied observer were to fall
out of the theory, then what is left is the interaction of insensate, unconscious objects.
This just does not do the work which a proper theory of consciousness has to do. William
Seager explains in Theories of Consciousness that such a theory has to attempt to solve
the “generation problem,” which is precisely the problem of how unfeeling matter
generates subjective experience.  In his own words:
The generation problem can be vividly expressed as the simple question: what is
it about matter that accounts for its ability to become conscious?  We know, pretty
well, how matter works, and there is no sign of consciousness in its fundamental
operations […] nor in the laws by which matter combines into ever more complex
chemical, biochemical, biological and ultimately human configurations.  (Seager
18)
Seager surveys attempts to deal with this problem from Descartes to the present,
including identity theories, panpsychism, representationalism, and various attempts to
dissolve the problem.  He concludes that none of the approaches produced by science or
philosophy satisfactorily answers the generation problem.
According to Seager, representational theories of mind, of which Damasio’s is an
example, face the particular problem of explaining why only some of the many
representations in the mind are conscious, while vastly more are not.  The problem is that
if representations generate consciousness, then all representations should be in
consciousness, but this is clearly not the case.  The example he cites is of human stereo
vision.  In normally-sighted  people, both eyes generate simultaneously separate
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representations of the same object.  Each of these representations can independently enter
consciousness, as when one eye is closed.  But when both eyes are open and facing the
same object, a single composite representation enters consciousness—the two
independent representations lose their status as objects of consciousness.  If each
representation independently conferred consciousness on an observer, he would have
double-consciousness of the same object, rather than consciousness of the composite
(Seager 164-165).  People with dramatically different levels of vision in their two eyes
learn to be aware of only the stronger eye’s representation—the other image almost
completely drops out of consciousness.  If representations generated consciousness, it is
hard to understand how some representations could fail to be conscious.
Interestingly, Damasio’s theory of mind does offer a partial explanation of this
particular problem of representational consciousness.  Damasio’s theory posits that only
those sensory representations which interact with representations of the body enter into
consciousness.  If something happens to the body and it does not enter consciousness,
that is because the event was not imaged.  If a representation forms in the brain but does
not connect to body images, it does not enter consciousness.  But if an image forms and
does fire some of the neurons responsible for representing the body, then that image
enters consciousness.
While Damasio’s theory offers a possible solution to this one shortcoming of
representational theories of consciousness, it fails in the more fundamental task of
solving the generation problem.  As Seager discusses it, consciousness seems to be
separated from matter by an almost ontological divide—matter and mind appear to be
two very different things conceptually.  No attempts to explain mind in terms of matter
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have yet succeeded.  Indeed, it is not even obvious what a materialistic theory of
consciousness would have to look like in order to satisfactorily solve the generation
problem.  Damasio’s theory performs a novel maneuver when it suggests that the
interaction of representations generates consciousness.  And maybe this is the case,
maybe the interaction of body-images and world-images is the source of consciousness.
Maybe consciousness is just the phenomenal space between simultaneously held images,
but Damasio does not explain how to bridge the quasi-ontological gap between mind and
matter.  He just does not offer anything which could explain mind at its most basic level.
Damasio insists repeatedly that his view of the mind is not homuncular.  And it is
not homuncular in a literal sense, there is no little man nor a pineal gland which
magically confers consciousness onto the brain.  Damasio is aware of the danger of
making this mistake, but he does something very much like it anyway.  He relocates the
homunculus to functional space, which is to say that the observer is not a physical object,
but observation is implicit in the process of representing or imaging the world.  This
illustrates the subtlety of the homuncular-theatrical mistake.
Still, one must wonder why a man as smart as Damasio would make a mistake
which he is deliberately guarding against.  This is because the theory still works as a
description of the processes which underlie the conscious mind, even though it cannot
explain consciousness itself.  Damasio’s mistake was trying to identify consciousness
itself with the underlying representational process and mechanisms, the neurological
substrate of conscious experience.  At heart, argues Seager, this is the mistake which all
identity theories make (Seager 47-48).
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2.3 The Theory as Mechanical Description
Damasio’s theory does serve at least as a mechanical description of consciousness
because it describes the mechanisms of subjective experience and the explanation accords
with the phenomenology of such experiences.  He posits that emotion and instinct result
from representations of the body.  Emotions begin when the brain forms an image of an
object and this image affects the body in the manners which correspond to anger, fear,
happiness, sadness, disgust, etc.  The emotion is complete when the brain images the
body in the process of reacting emotionally.  Instinct is when the brain’s representation of
the body displays an imbalance of some chemical factor.  The brain then creates an urge
to balance that factor.  This theory posits the existence of object representations and body
representations and requires that they interact.  Damasio presents empirical evidence for
the existence of both kinds of representations, thus all the remains is to justify terming
them such.
Object representations are present in the form of memories.  In order for a person
to recognize a previously-viewed object, there has to be some sort of record of the object
in the brain, and that pattern must somehow be isomorphic to the features of the original.
Damasio explains memory as a two-stage process.  Memories begin in “early sensory
cortices,” which are the parts of the brain that first receive signals from the sense organs.
There are different cortices for different sense modalities.  Damasio explains that these
parts of the brain form “topographically organized representations” of the original objects
(Damasio 98, note p. 104, fig. 5-2).  This is to say that the brain forms a neural pattern in
the likeness of the original, that the neural object resembles the original.  These
topographical representations are later stored as “dispositional representations,” which
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are not themselves topographically-organized.  All knowledge, whether acquired or
innate, is stored as these dispositional representations (Damasio 102-105).  This type of
representation is not an image of anything, but a stored pattern of neural firing.  Each
such representation is a set of operating instructions, which instruct different parts of the
brain to fire in certain patterns.  When someone recalls a memory, the dispositional
representation for an object activates and instructs the early sensory cortices to
reconstruct the image of the object as it first formed there (ibid.).  Remembering
something feels so much like seeing it again because memory activates some of the same
“circuits” that activated during the original viewing.  The dispositional representation is
like a digital recording of a sound or image, which does not resemble the original, but can
instruct a digital device to reconstruct the stored object.  Thus memory is a process of
representation, in the sense that a likeness of an object forms in the brain, and is then
stored in another format.
The second sort of mental representations Damasio describes are of the body.
There are substantial sections of the brain which clearly do function to monitor the body.
The behavior of these “maps” corresponds to the behavior of the body and thus the maps
are representations of body.  The Penfield homunculus is the most notorious of such body
images, but it is not the only one.  There are somatosensory brain areas which pay
particular attention to touch, temperature (as felt by the skin), pain, and the sensations
generated by muscles, joints and viscera (Damasio 65).  The somatosensory regions sense
what is occurring in the body just as other areas sense what is happening outside the
body.
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A radical defense of Damasio would assert that distinguishing between sensation
and body state is arbitrary.  To see is to know that the eye (a part of the body) is receiving
light.  To feel heat is to know that some part of the body is receiving heat.  To feel pain is
for some part of the body to be damaged.  Thus, sensation can also a case of body-
representation, as are the sensations of joint position or pain.
In any case, somatosensory areas generate an “integrated map” (different maps
and data are integrated) of the state of the body (Damasio 66).  The right hemisphere
seems to do more of the work of monitoring the body than the left, because damage to the
right somatosensory cortices has a more profound effect than damage to the left.
Anosognosia results from damage only to the right somatosensory regions.  In this
condition, patients are unaware of physical damage and handicap.  Such a patient might
be unable to move one of his arms, but does not know it unless told.  The victim will be
genuinely surprised when informed of his defect, and some will even forget about it later.
These patients still think, reason and still sense the outer world, but their brains are no
longer informing them of the correct condition of the body (Damasio 64-66).  The
infamous “phantom limb” syndrome occurs when certain brain areas responsible for
monitoring the body are damaged, but the background static maps of the body are still
intact.  Without updated information about the state of the body, the victim feels the body
as it is represented in the intact static maps, which are built into the brain by the genes.
Both the anosognosic and the phantom limb victim perceive their bodies incorrectly
because of how the bodies are represented by the brain.  Sensation results from those
representations of the body, not from the actual state of the body itself.  And so it turns
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out that Damasio is again correct to think that there are representations present in the
brain.
Damasio’s theory posits that these object and body representations interact to
produce emotions.  This interaction would be obvious from simple readings of brain
scans.  It is not likely that he would read the scans incorrectly, so it seems likely that the
neurons which create body images and those which create object images fire at the same
time.  But it is not necessarily the case that the firings of these two sets of neurons are
both part of emotion.  However, the phenomenology of emotion agrees with Damasio’s
theory on this point.  The five primary emotional states (happiness, sadness, anger, fear
and disgust) do involve distinct body states.  In this theory, an emotion is not just an
empty representation like the word “anger.”  Each emotion is an experience, a thought
which is felt because it is played out in the body.  The body signals a change to the brain,
which incorporates that change into the representation of the body.  And the
representation is felt as the experience of emotion.  This is a fair description of the
experience of emotion.  And so, though Damasio’s experience does not explain why
things feel as they do, he does at least describe the process which underlies subjectivity.
2.4 Conclusion
Damasio admits in the first chapter of The Feeling of What Happens that he
cannot explain qualia.  Although the theory fails to explain subjective consciousness, it
does succeed in describing some of the mechanical parts of mind.  Damasio provides a
plausible explanation of how memory, instinct, and emotion operate at the neurological
level.  Instinct and emotion depend on the representation of body states.  These
representations have a subjective feel about them, people respond to body states
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according to the way they feel.  But these subjective sensations arise from objects, from
things which can be observed.  And much of what Damasio proposes does accord with
phenomenology, not to mention the available evidence of neuroscience.  Emotion does
involve intense body states; memory is like experiencing something again; and
consciousness consists of sensation and the awareness of sensation.  Just because the
theory fails to explain why things feel as they do, it does not follow that his explanation
of the mechanics is also mistaken.  It is entirely reasonable to expect a mechanical
description of consciousness to precede an explanation of qualitative consciousness.  It is
enough for a theory to observe that neural objects have a feeling about them and to
explain how these neural objects behave.
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CHAPTER THREE: DAMASIO, “GOFAI,” AND EMBODIED COGNITION
3.1 Introduction
Through most of the twentieth century, the dominant paradigm of mechanistic
theories of mind was computation.  The underlying belief was that, like a Turing
machine, the brain contains symbols and operates on these according to logical rules.
This is the heart of any computational theory of mind (CTM).  The rise of digital
computers allowed researchers to build machines to test this belief, and they met with at
least modest success.  The collected attempts to emulate human intelligence with
computers is what John Haugeland calls “GOFAI,” for “Good Old Fashioned Artificial
Intelligence” (Haugeland 112).  It is “old fashioned” because new approaches to AI
emerged in the wake of GOFAI’s many failures.  The major contemporary alternatives to
GOFAI are connectionism and embodied cognition.  The central tenet of connectionism
is the belief that intelligence arises from the patterns of neurons in the brain, rather than
from the processing of symbols.  Embodied cognition (EC), in its most radical
formulation, holds that a centralized symbol-crunching computer is not necessary to
produce intelligent behavior.  While connectionism is interesting in its own right, it is
rather less radical than embodied cognition.  A connectionist network is still a centralized
computing device, one in which symbols are replaced by patterns of neurons and firing
strengths (Clark, Mindware, 62).  Thus, connectionism can be understood as a subset-of
GOFAI in this context, as much as some theorists would object.  Embodied cognition is a
much more radical approach than connectionism because EC is decentralized and does
not rely on symbol processing.  The body is the processing unit and the world “is its own
best representation” (Rodney Brooks, qtd. in Clark, Being There, 46).
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On first glance, it is not apparent at how Damasio’s theory of mind should be
understood in relation to either GOFAI or EC.  Damasio’s theory is representational, like
GOFAI, but its representations are of the body.  The representations in Damasio’s
scheme are not the empty lingua-form symbols of a Turing machine, and the operations
therein are not the strict logic of computers.  Moreover, Damasio’s theory uses the body
as the core of computational cognition.  The theory uses the body to think, but not in
exactly the same way that EC does.  Thence, it is not apparent where Damasio’s theory
fits into the large realm of cognitive science.
Cogburn and Megill (2005) suggest that Damasio’s ideas can supplement GOFAI,
that the somatic markers offer a possible solution to the “frame problem” of cognitive
science.  Coupling Damasio to GOFAI might solve the worst problems of computational
theories of mind.  However, GOFAI is such a deeply flawed approach that nothing might
be able to save it.  Coupling Damasio’s theory with EC not only makes more sense
conceptually, but appears to lead to a more powerful theory of mind.
3.2 Symbolic Computation and “GOFAI”
The modern digital computer originated conceptually with Alan Turing’s
hypothetical device.  A Turing machine would consist of a sort of simple processor with
onboard instructions (like a modern CPU), a reading/writing head, and a long line of tape
with symbols imprinted on it.  The processor has enough memory to recall what symbol
was last read and what state the machine is in.  Given instructions for performing some
task like addition, the Turing machine would receive a series of symbols.  It would then
read the symbols, operate on them inside the processor, and rewrite the appropriate
output to the tape.  Input values have to be encoded symbolically according to the logic
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of the system, and the answer has to be interpreted accordingly.  Turing showed that such
a device should be able to solve any sufficiently well-specified problem (Clark,
Mindware, 10-12).  This was the beginning of modern computation.
Shortly after Turing, digital computers became available and generations of
programmers and engineers advanced this technology.  A program written in the
contemporary language C++ would compute just as does the Turing device sketched
above.  The technology and syntax are vastly more sophisticated than what Turing
envisioned, but the principles are the same.  A C++ program might read from a data file
which looks something like this:
A 6 7 7 8 5 6 -1
B 3 4 5 5 2 -1
C 6 7 6 7 6 7 8 6 -1
…
The letters on each line are ID tags, indicating that record A is on the first line, B is on
the second and so forth.  The positive numbers on the lines might represent number of
eggs a person ate in a given week, or number of cigarettes he smoked in an eight-hour
period, or anything.  The negative ones are “end of line” sentinels, which tells the
program that the data for the record is over.  C++ syntax is sophisticated enough to
recognize the end-of-line character embedded in data files, but the technique of marking
the end of a record is useful both for the amateur programmer and for the purposes of
illustration.
A C++ program for averaging the number numbers here would have instructions
to read the ID tag and store that to temporary memory.  It would then read the integers,
add them to the total, store the total in memory, and continue until it read the sentinel.
Then it would write the final total to a new data file, indicating that the average number
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for record A is 6.5 or 7 (depending on whether the answer is formatted for real numbers
or integers), the average for B is 3.8 and so forth.  After computing the total for each line,
the program would move to the next line as long as there are letters to read.  When there
are no more letters, it would close the source file, commit whatever final instructions it
has, and end the program.  What should be apparent here is that the techniques for
computation are more sophisticated and agile than what Turing described, but the
function is the same in its underlying principles.  The system reads symbols, performs
logical operations on them according to an algorithm, and outputs an answer if the
problem is sufficiently well specified.  The point here is that modern computation is still
computation in the sense that Turing envisioned.  No matter how sophisticated a modern
computer program may be, at bottom it just processes alphanumeric symbols and logical
operators.
The symbols in GOFAI are not intrinsically meaningful.  They only gain meaning
from the larger context in which they are applied.  The hypothetical C++ program
described above would have instructions in it that make it output a line of text
interspersed with the numerical results.  So, the program would have instructions to
output “Client ‘ID’ ate ‘average’ eggs per week for ‘count’ weeks,” which would output
“Client A ate 6.5 eggs per week for 6 weeks.”  The program would “know” how many
weeks each record describes because it would have kept count of the number of times it
performed the read-add instruction.  Though the program would output such text and this
would certainly seem to indicate a thoughtful response, of course this is just computation.
These numbers might have meant anything.
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Semantics might seem to be a stumbling point for GOFAI, but the general
assumption has been that the meaning of the calculated values becomes apparent in the
larger scheme of application.  Cognition, as people experience it, is only the sum of a
great many simultaneous calculations.  The computational landscape of a mind is so rich
that each computation gains meaning from this context.  As Haugeland said, “if you take
care of the syntax, the semantics will take care of itself” (qtd. in Clark, Mindware, 9).
Haugeland summarizes things quite nicely:
A GOFAI system has an inner playing field, on which inner tokens are arranged
and manipulated by one or more inner players under the supervision of an inner
referee.  These inner token manipulations are interpreted as the thought processes
by virtue of which the overall system manages to make sense and act intelligently.
In other words, the overall intelligence is explained by analyzing the system into
smaller (less intelligent) components, whose external symbolic moves and
interactions are the larger system’s internal reasonable cognitions [sic].  That’s the
paradigm of cognitive science.  (Haugeland 117)
Rather, this was the paradigm of cognitive science for several decades.  Connectionism
rose to prominence during the 1980’s, and embodied cognition appeared in the 1990’s.
In any case, Turing-style computation used to be the accepted explanation for human
intelligence.  While human-like intellect has never been achieved by a symbol-
manipulator, modern computers certainly can accomplish a great many tasks with the
techniques of computation.  Any sort of analysis which reduces to numbers and
mathematical procedures, for example, are perfect tasks for GOFAI.  But, as Hubert
Dreyfus explained over thirty years ago, this technique is just not sufficient for producing
genuine intelligence.
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3.3 The Limits of GOFAI
Hubert Dreyfus wrote the major critique of artificial reason, What Computer
Can’t Do (later updated and released as What Computers Still Can’t Do).  Dreyfus
identifies four assumptions that GOFAI or any computational theory of mind (CTM) has
to make.  He gives them in this order:
(1) The biological assumption holds that the brain must act like a computer or
other device, performing mechanical operations on internally-represented
facts according to internally-represented rules.
(2) The psychological assumption holds that the mind must also act like a
computer, which is to say that thoughts (at the personal or sub-personal
levels) must be analogous to the algorithms in computer programs.
(3) The epistemological assumption holds that (a) human knowledge can be
represented by propositions or rules and (b) those propositions can be used to
reproduce human behavior.
(4) The ontological assumption holds that the world of human experience consists
of discrete and determinate elements.
Of these assumptions, (1) and (4) are the most defensible, though their veracity is still in
question.  The biological assumption has not yet been proven, but also not yet refuted..
While neuroscience has learned a great deal since Dreyfus about the workings of the
brain, it is by no means obvious even now that the brain-computer analogy is accurate.
Similarly, the ontological assumption is an uncertain claim.  However, these two
assumptions are not the real problems for GOFAI.
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The real snags for any CTM come from the second and third assumptions.  People
do not seem to think quite like computers, as in the psychological assumption.  And it is
not obvious that human behavior can be described by rules, much less reproduced by
them, as in the epistemological assumption.  Computers contain representations of rules
and information, and they perform logical operations (computations) on these
representations.  Dreyfus provides examples from the history of digital computers to
show how the computational approach fails to reproduce human intelligence.
When Dreyfus discusses the psychological assumption, he identifies some major
differences between human intelligence and mechanical calculation.  The most
conspicuous difference he identifies is what he calls “zeroing in,” which is especially
evident in the different approaches men and computers take to playing chess.  According
to Dreyfus, computers calculate tens of thousands of possible moves based on the
configuration of pieces on the board.  The computer then selects the best of these moves
according to its set of chess-playing instructions.  Working from the same board, from the
same initial conditions, expert human players only contemplate tens or hundreds of
moves (Dreyfus 102-103).  Human players somehow just know what moves are the
correct ones, without evaluating all of the possibilities.  They are somehow able to zero
in on the set of correct moves out of the vast set of possible moves.  Whatever it is that
people do when playing chess, it seems to differ from the “brute force” method that
computers use (ibid.).  In Dreyfus’ words, “[T]hinking and perception involve global
processes which cannot be understood in terms of a sequence or even a parallel set of
discrete operations” (163).  “Global” here refers only to the strange ability of the mind to
deal with large sets of information as wholes, rather than as pieces.  A person
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demonstrates “global” thinking when he zeros in on a few correct moves out of the
countless thousands of possible ones. A computer necessarily deals with the same
situation piecemeal.
This zeroing in phenomenon shows a difference between men and machines that
is very hard to explain away.  The computationalist will insist that people must make
thousands of calculations in order to play chess.  If these calculations do not occur
consciously, then they must occur subconsciously.  The problem is that even
subconscious calculations do not explain zeroing in.  Dreyfus’ point is that zeroing in is
not an algorithmic, stepwise process.  A computer has to consider each possible move as
if it were the right one, it does not have the immediate instinct that some moves are better
than others.  Thus, even the subconscious stratagem does not save the psychological
assumption—human thought appears to be different from the algorithms inside a
computer's memory.  However, even if the Computationalist finds some way to dodge
this problem, he still has to deal with the epistemological assumption.
The truth of the epistemological assumption speaks directly to the plausibility of
any CTM.  This assumption consists of two claims: (a) human knowledge can be
represented by propositions and (b) those propositions can be used to reproduce human
behavior.  Dreyfus offers a stronger argument against the second claim.  He points out
that if a computer were programmed with a body of rules about language, the computer
would have a hard time dealing with odd or incorrect utterances.  Such a computer can
only recognize an utterance to be correct or incorrect according to its rules.
A person can understand the meaning of a grammatically-incorrect statement,
sometimes quite easily.  Minor slips in grammar do not necessarily prevent
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communication.  For a computer, however, a grammatically-incorrect statement is
meaningless.   The computer would also have a hard time dealing with odd statements
such as a non-literal utterance like “The idea is in the pen” (Dreyfus 198-199).  A
computer would have to analyze the terms “idea” and “pen” and conclude that this
statement is not possible. The problem is that the rule-governed behavior of computers
winds up being very inflexible, non-adaptive, unintelligent.
According to Dreyfus, this sort of inflexibility recurs over and over in Artificial
Intelligence work.  Researchers write a program to perform a specific complex task, one
which closely mimics some human capacity.  The program often succeeds impressively
in its set task.  But when the programmers attempt to apply their software to other
problems, when they attempt to generalize to a domain of human performance, the
program suddenly comes up short.  Software, for example, which can identify geometric
shapes suddenly becomes quite confused when light and shadow are introduced (Dreyfus
15-20).  And simple acts of locomotion have been notoriously difficult for GOFAI robots
to reproduce.  Traditional walking robots seem more adept at falling down than anything
else.
Faced with the shortcomings of their machines, programmers might try to solve
the problem by adding more rules and more information to an expert system.  But this
does not give the computer a human level of competence.  A computer would either need
a near-infinite set of rules to cover every specific conceivable circumstance, or else it
would need rules to govern the use of its rules, and rules to govern the use of these rules
and so forth.  In either case, the set of rules necessary to mimic human competence would
have to be impracticably immense (Dreyfus 199-200).  The point is that finite sets of data
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do not seem able to generate the kind of creative performance, the adaptive competence,
which humans manifest in their actions.  Thus, the rule-driven approach to reproducing
human performance seems incorrect.  As Dreyfus says, “the general laws of competence
cannot be directly applied to simulate behavior” (202).
GOFAI would seem to face an immense problem if the epistemological
assumption is incorrect.  Human behavior might not reduce to rules.  If Dreyfus is
correct, GOFAI is simply a wrong approach.  Rules and propositions seem unable to
reproduce human mentality.
3.4 Embodied Cognition
Symbolic computation can perform specific actions of minimal scope which
appear to be intelligent, but which simply fail to produce intelligence in the realm beyond
well-specified logical problems.  Because computation fails in many real-world
scenarios, some robotics researchers developed a technique which is about as far away
from GOFAI as seems possible.  They developed robots which do not have a central
processing unit, thus their behavior is not controlled by a digital computer.  These robots
do not look at the world for symbols and attempt to apply instructions to those symbols.
They also do not have the immense data “models” which are necessary to make
computational systems operate in complex problems (Clark, Being There, 21-22).  These
models are the sets of data and instructions which are meant to guide the robot in any
conceivable circumstance, and allow it to reason its way through unforeseen problems.
However, such data models can grow improbably immense and still not produce adaptive
behavior.  Instead of using such models, these new robots use their bodies to interact with
the world.  They solve problems not with symbolic manipulation, but by trial-and-error
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manipulations of their own bodies.  This sort of embodied cognition (EC) has achieved
surprising, even revolutionary, degrees of success.
A good example of embodied cognition are two six-legged robots built at Case
Western Reserve in the early 1990’s.  Each of the six legs has a control circuit which can
raise the leg, swing it forward, or swing it backward.  There are also “inhibitory
linkages,” which are feedback sensors to let the legs “know” when the others are resting
stable on the ground.  The legs move in patterns in which one tripod of legs is stable
while the other moves.  Then the stationary tripod begins its own motion cycle (Clark
Being There, 15-17).  The legs move in sequence rather like the firing pattern of the spark
plugs in older cars with distributor caps—the circuitry is built to fire in a certain
sequence without instruction from a computer.  This approach is more successful than
GOFAI at moving robots around, but it also does this without an enormous effort of
computation.
The differences between GOFAI and EC are considerable, but the distinction
between the two is actually not as sharp as one might expect.  The six-legged robots
described above are clearly EC.  On the other hand, a robot which visually surveys its
environment and compares what it sees to the list of characteristics labeled “stable
purchase” would clearly be GOFAI.  However, intermediate cases are conceivable.
Installing a Turing-style device to control the legs of each of the hexapods would not
necessarily move it from the category of EC to GOFAI and would likely not make it as
clumsy as a GOFAI robot (this is a project conceived by Rodney Brooks at MIT and
described in Clark, Being There, 15).
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Clark believes that EC is powerful because it is (1) decentralized and distributed
across the robot’s body and (2) does not use the immense data models which actually
seem to slow down GOFAI (Being There 21-22).  Of these two, it seems that the first is
less important to EC than the second.  Clark does not offer an a priori reason why
locating all of the circuits in one centralized location would necessarily impact the
machine’s function.  The hexapod legs are controlled by simple circuits—it just does not
matter whether that circuit is located on the leg or in the thorax.  Circuits in the thorax
would simply require longer lengths of wire to connect them to the legs than circuits
located directly in the legs.  The only obvious difference centralization would make is
that the centrally-controlled robot would not be as robust as the distributed version.
Damage to the central control apparatus could paralyze an entire robot, but the distributed
robot would still be able to move if one of its leg controls were damaged.  However, in
terms of function, Clark does not establish that centralization of control necessarily
impedes a GOFAI.
More important is the second issue, the use of data models in traditional AI.  This
seems to be the defining characteristic of GOFAI.  At heart, a traditional AI searches its
environment for elements which correspond to a symbol in its program.  This is at least
loosely analogous to the function of a Turing device; for a GOFAI system, the entire
world is like a line of symbol-bearing tape.  If and when it locates the appropriate
symbolic elements, it attempts to apply (lingua-form) rules for behavior to the situation.
It may have to consult other rules to instruct it how to “reason” over this situation.  And if
Dreyfus’s description of the history of AI is correct, this technique almost invariably fails
when applied to real-world scenarios.  EC is more successful than GOFAI in dealing with
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some robotics problems, but it also qualitatively resembles what living creatures do.  EC
proponents claim that the hexapods move in some ways like the insects they resemble.
As Clark says, EC “has all the flavor of real, biological intelligence” (Being There, 17).
EC works for simple robots and simple locomotion, but there is evidence that
sophisticated animal brains operate like an EC, at least some of the time.  An example is
how human infants learn to walk.  They try to use their legs at birth, but stop around two
months when the legs get too heavy relative to muscle mass.  Once the muscle mass
increases, they start trying to walk again around ten months of age.  The entire process of
learning to use the legs seems to be controlled by the structure of the legs themselves, by
the tendency of the legs to move in certain ways.  The child seems to have to learn how to
use its own body, and seems not to have an onboard blueprint or program to control the
process (Clark, Being There, 40-42).
Another example of people acting like an EC is when they play the game Tetris,
in which falling blocks of different shapes have to be arranged to make solid lines.  What
is interesting is that people playing the game will rotate the pieces several times before
dropping them, in an attempt to “see” what the best configuration of pieces would be.
This kind of transformation would be easy for a symbolic computer, but human beings
change their environment rather than the contents of their own minds in order to make a
computational problem easier.  According to Clark, a sign of an embodied mind is when
it manipulates the world in order to make thinking easier (Being There, 65-66).  Tetris is
an example, but so too are more mundane examples like moving one piece of furniture to
determine what a new configuration of an entire office would look like.
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The examples Clark cites of EC-like human behavior could be the result of
computation; his evidence is not entirely convincing on the point.  But there is a body of
data to indicate that even the sophisticated human brain has to interact with the world and
adjust the body in order to solve problems, like a simpler EC system.  The human brain
also resorts to simplifying the world in order to solve spatial transformation problems that
should be easy for computation.  This evidence suggests that the human brain does not
always compute answers, that it behaves like an EC some of the time.
Embodied cognition has its advantages, but even strong proponents like Clark do
not think it can entirely reproduce human intelligence.  He warns that abandoning
traditional AI techniques wholesale in favor of EC would be tantamount to washing away
babies with “floods of bathwater” (Being There, 22).  There is just too much about human
intellect that seems computational or representational.  Damasio actually explains the
appeal of centralized, computational-representational theories of mind when he describes
brains as intermediate to stimulus and response (Error, 89).  Brains enable complex
responses, as though sensory input is being manipulated in the manner that a computer
operates on representations.  It is hard to imagine that an EC would ever be able to use
language, contemplate a complex situation, or imagine possible outcomes.  Such a device
would never have the experience of thinking about anything.  There must be more to
intelligence than embodied cognition.
3.5 Damasio I and II
EC and GOFAI have both proven to be insufficient paradigms of cognition, but it
is not clear how they should be altered.  The two approaches are so antithetical that they
seem incapable of rapprochement, so combining them seems out of the question.
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Damasio’s theory might be able to function as a stand-alone theory of mind, but it is far
too underdeveloped for that purpose.  Alternatively, Damasio’s theory could be coupled
with one of the other paradigms to produce a stronger approach to cognition.  Ultimately,
pairing Damasio with EC makes more sense than joining his theory with GOFAI.
Damasio I would be the addition of Damasio’s theory to GOFAI.  Cogburn and
Megill propose that Damasio’s theory would be able to solve the infamous frame
problem of cognitive science.  This is the problem of determining salience.  Whenever an
autonomous robot is given a task, it has to process a vast data model in order to calculate
an answer.  The problem is that such systems usually tend to fail to identify the important
elements of a situation, the rule-driven approach fails and the robot simply does not know
what to do.
Cogburn and Megill propose that Damasio’s frontal-lobe patients are suffering
from a human version of the frame problem.  They propose that the somatic markers
assign sufficient priority to the elements of a situation that the computer can calculate
solutions.  Positive emotions make some representation of an object more desirable,
negative emotions make one less desirable.  The pleasantness or unpleasantness can
affect how mind operates on the object.  Emotions, which create somatic markers,
essentially edit data to allow computational processes to occur (Megill 309-312).  In the
absence of emotional content (the pre-frontal cases), cognition fails.  Such is the case of
Damasio’s patient, Elliot.
Damasio I is really quite clever, but it does not get away from the deeper
problems of GOFAI.  All four of the assumptions of AI which Dreyfus identified will
plague Damasio I.  On the other hand, Damasio II, the joining of Damasio with EC,
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avoids all of those assumptions.  Further, it seems more plausible that evolution would
have designed a somatic mind (a mind based on somatic computation) to solve the
problems a body would face rather than the more abstract problems a GOFAI is
programmed to solve.
Damasio II seems more plausible than Damasio I because the ideas integrate more
closely, and DII should be immune to the frame problem like DI.  Under DII, an
organism would have its body as something of the “front line” of cognition, but there
would be a whole second tier of cognitive capacities supporting the body.  Over time, the
use of the body would become programmed in the brain, the patterns of motion would
come to be represented in the brain.  And the brain would learn to operate on the
representations of body state (such operations are posited by Damasio’s theory).  Once
these representations are programmed or learned, the system learns how to manipulate
the body, but it can also modify those representations in the process of imagination.
Clark’s discussion of an infant learning to walk by feeling out its own body might be an
example of embodiment programming representative cognition (Being There, 40-42).  A
DII system also matches up with Damasio’s observation that the maps of the body in the
brain are constantly updated with fresh information from the body.  Damasio’s theory
seems to match up with EC better than GOFAI.  Further, a DII system would be at least
as computationally robust as the DI system proposed by Cogburn and Megill, but it might
be even more robust.
An Embodied Cognition device would be utterly immune to the frame problem.
If one of the Case Western hexapods could not find stable purchase, it would slide and
stumble across a surface until it found such.  An EC never faces the frame problem
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because it is not calculating anything; bodies do not suffer framing problems.  DI might
be able to solve the frame problem, but DII would avoid it entirely because of the
connection of the body to representational cognition.  Whenever the calculations in the
representational part of a DII system fail, control shunts back to the body, which can then
feel its way through a situation.  This is decidedly reminiscent of what happens when a
person faces some new situation; whether the new situation require a physical or
intellectual skill, people have to feel their way through it, even if they have guidance.  A
GOFAI cannot typically learn anything, but has to be programmed with its skills; DI
system would be similarly limited.  A DII system, on the other hand, would have the
body present as the tool for studying the environment.  The body and its somatic logic
would provide a finite set of possible approaches to any possible problem; all one has to
do is to feel out a situation, try different alternatives, and find what works.  Embodied
Cognition and a DII system should both be immune to the frame problem, whereas DI
systems have to solve it.
The process of learning described above certainly seems to happen for physical
tasks such as playing sports or learning to play a musical instrument, but something about
the process is reminiscent of the way people learn complex intellectual skills.  Language,
chess moves, ethical conduct, and even mathematical calculations can all be represented
in terms of body states.  A sound results from a certain state of the vocal chords—and
even expert readers sometimes move their lips when they read, because words are made
up of body states.  Chess moves are rule-governed motions through physical space, easily
represented by images of body states.  Ethical conduct rests on imagining the states of
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other bodies.  And mathematical calculations begin with the base-ten system of the
fingers.  All of this is far from conclusive, but it will make for extraordinary future work.
3.6 A Research Program for the Future
Damasio’s posits that neural representations of the body are essential to cognition,
that the body is the foundation and subject of most cognitive processes.  If true, his theory
could be an important complement to the Embodied Cognition paradigm of cognitive
science.  A machine or organism which uses somatic computations to supplement its
embodied cognition (or vice versa) could potentially be more intelligent that either a
GOFAI or EC.  However, both empirical and philosophical research will be required to
develop a combined theory of Somatic Computation and Embodied Cognition (SCEC).
The first challenge for this paradigm would be to identify the neural representations of
the body and to describe their behavior as representations.  In order for SCEC to operate,
there must be “somatic logic” built into the brain.  This is to say that the body must be
represented in a way that its representations can be manipulated in a quasi-computational
manner.  The “virtual body” necessary for somatic computation needs to be identified as
a representation, and the brain’s manipulations of this representation need to be treated as
computational processes.
If the brain represents the body, it either does so with traditional data “models”
consisting of rules and lingua-form symbols, or it does so by some other means.  The
rule-driven, data-modeling approach fails to generate intelligence, so something else must
be happening.  Damasio is never explicit about what kind of body-representation occurs
in the brain.  He mentions that there are groups of neurons in the brain dedicated to
monitoring the body.  Further, the body and brain communicate in great detail to each
58
other with both nerves and chemicals in the bloodstream.  Thus, the maps of the body in
the brain are constantly updated with new information.  That is as far as Damasio goes
with explaining the representation of the body.
However the body is represented in the brain, that representation cannot be of the
lingua-form variety.  Instead, it seems to be necessary that the brain contains a
neurological object which somehow acts like the body.  The rules of the body must be
stored directly as patterns of neurons which mimic the body’s action.  The following is
speculation well beyond what Damasio offers, but the previous discussion of
centralization in EC suggests a starting point for the study of the virtual body.  If a robot
or organism were controlled by distributed, decentralized circuits, there seems to be no
reason in principle why the control circuits could not be moved to a central location.  The
resulting circuit-board would have features which correspond to all of the functions of the
body which the board can control.  One circuit would connect to each part of the body
which is directly controlled.  This circuit-board is potentially an analogue to the body.
The board would likely have fewer degrees of freedom than the body it controls; some
features of the body would doubtless not be controlled directly by the central device.
However, the control board might still be enough like the body to act as a representation
of it.  If the structural relationships present within the body (the effects each body part
has on other parts) were present in this circuit board, then this neurological object could
be the foundation on which a representation of the body is built.  In the sense that this
hypothetical circuit-board would correspond to the functions of the body, it could be the
neurological object needed for SCEC.
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This circuit-board would be connected to the body it controls directly, but could
also be connected to some sort of computational “scratch space” in the brain.  If the
control circuits connect to neurons which are not connected directly to the body, these
other neurons could be a computational area, the inner playing field Haugeland describes
for GOFAI.  Motor neurons certainly are connected to non-motor neurons in the brain;
each neuron, on average, is connected to thousands of others.  Thus the body’s own
control circuitry could be the foundation for a “virtual body.”  The features of this control
board or virtual body could act like a set of rules for body-based computation—they are
not linguistic rules, but somatic ones.  These rules would be equivalent to “the legs move
backward and forward,” “the arms move up, down, left and right” and so forth.
However, the rules would not be linguistic artifacts as here, but stored patterns of
neuronal firing which correspond to the motions of the body.  These patterns of body
states/motions could be the representations on which a computational mind rests, rather
than lingua-form rules of GOFAI.  This is to say that the very neurons which control the
body could also serve as the neurological object which SCEC requires.  This is a
promising area for future research into SCEC.
3.7 Conclusion
While the circuit board is entirely a point of speculation, SCEC is still promising
in another respect.  This paradigm would posit a mind which matches phenomenology
much more closely than GOFAI.  A somatic mind would operate on representations of
the body’s states and functions.  This means that the mind would contain not lingua-form
rules and representations of information, but the very patterns of body operation
necessary to act in the world.  Particular motions each correspond to a set of fired
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neurons, and these patterns of firing (possibly Damasio’s “dispositional representations”)
would be the subject of computation.  Moving the arm in a circle is a describable set of
neuron firings, and that set of firings can be manipulated like any other representation.
The somatic mind would be able to remember past body states and past motions, but
would also be able to imagine new body states and new motions.  Thus, memories and
imaginings would consist of concrete body states rather than the abstract content which
lingua-form representations are supposed to embody.  Human experience seems to
consist largely of sensations, of the feeling of what happens.  These are things which can
be described by language, but cannot be computationally reproduced by language.  A
mind consisting of body states seems closer to phenomenology than any GOFAI could
ever get.
Damasio’s theory and SCEC might never be complete theories of mind, because
neither seems able to explain subjective consciousness.  Damasio thinks that the actions
of body-representations can generate consciousness.  He also thinks that consciousness
comes only from representations and not from the body itself (thence “phantom limb”
syndrome).  Just as a point of philosophical speculation, this theory of mind might get a
step closer to subjectivity by positing consciousness to be the correlation of
representations with their objects.  This would probably not get to consciousness, but
might get a little closer to it, conceptually speaking.  Nonetheless, even if a somatic
theory of mind cannot explain consciousness itself, it could still be a better theory than
anything else out there.  GOFAI just does not work to reproduce human-style
intelligence.  If Hubert Dreyfus, Andy Clark and Rodney Brooks are right, it will never
succeed in producing an authentic mind.  However, embodied cognition by itself almost
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certainly cannot get to the human mind either.  EC cannot explain the computationally-
tractable aspects of the mind such as language and imagination.  SCEC would combine
the best parts of both paradigms into a theory that might explain the phenomenology of
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